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Abstract
We exploit admission lotteries to estimate the payoffs to the dentistry study in the
Netherlands. Using data from up to 22 years after the lottery, we find that in most
years after graduation dentists earn around 50,000 Euros more than they would earn
in their next-best profession. The payoff is larger for men than for women but does
not vary with high school GPA. The large payoffs cannot be attributed to longer
working hours, larger human capital investments or sacrifices in family outcomes.
The natural explanation is that Dutch dentists extract a monopoly rent, which we
attribute to the limited supply of dentists in the Netherlands. We discuss policies to
curtail this rent.
JEL-codes: J44; I18; I23; C36
Keywords: Dentists, returns to education, monopoly rents, random assignment
1 Introduction
The Dutch government regulates the supply of dentists by limiting the number of students
that are admitted to the dentistry study. This has resulted in a situation where the number
of dentists is lower than in other developed countries that otherwise have comparable
health facilities. Figure 1 shows that in 2013/4, there were 0.52 professionally active
dentists per 1000 inhabitants in the Netherlands, while this number is 0.60 in the US, 0.65
in France, 0.89 in Germany and 0.99 in Norway (OECD, 2017).
The restricted supply of dentists in the Netherlands is likely to drive up the prices of
dental care and result in high earnings for dentists. In an effort to control the cost of dental
*This version: February 2018. Ketel: University of Gothenburg. Department of Economics. PO Box
640. SE 405 30 Göteborg. Sweden (nadine.ketel@economics.gu.se); Leuven: University of Oslo. Depart-
ment of Economics. Postboks 1095 Blindern. 0317 Oslo. Norway (edwin.leuven@econ.uio.no); Ooster-
beek: University of Amsterdam. School of Economics. Postbus 15551. 1001 NB Amsterdam. Netherlands
(h.oosterbeek@uva.nl); Van der Klaauw: VUUniversity Amsterdam. Department of Economics. De Boele-
laan 1105. 1081 HV Amsterdam. Netherlands (b.vander.klaauw@vu.nl). The non-public micro data used
in this paper are available via remote access to the Microdata services of Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Van
der Klaauw acknowledges financial support from Vici-grant from the Dutch Science Foundation (NWO).
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Figure 1. Density of practicing dentists by country, in 2014
care, the Dutch Healthcare Authority sets maximum rates per treatment in annual nego-
tiations/consultations with the The Royal Dutch Dentistry Association, the professional
association for dentists, oral surgeons and orthodontists in the Netherlands. However,
even with price cap regulation there may be ample scope for extracting monopoly rents
in the Dutch dental market if the caps are too high, but also by reducing the quality of
services (f.e. time spend on treatment), or through increased supplier induced demand.
This paper investigates this possibility by estimating the financial payoffs to studying
dentistry in the Netherlands. Estimating the financial payoffs to a specific field of study
requires a comparison group of people who could have become dentists but for exogenous
reasons, did not. We take advantage of the fact that in the years 1991 to 1999, there were
always more applicants for dentistry school in the Netherlands than available seats and
that a lottery determined which applicants were admitted. Losers of this admission lottery
are an ideal comparison group. Combining data on results of the admission lotteries with
data on later earnings outcomes allows us to estimate the causal effect of studying den-
tistry on earnings. In addition to earnings outcomes, we also examine whether studying
dentistry instead of the next-best field, affects working hours, human capital investments
and private-life outcomes.
We are not the first to relate the earnings of dentists to limited supply. In an early
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study, Shepard (1978) compares prices for dental services and mean dentists’ income
between thirty-five states in the US that restricted licensing of out-of-state dentists and
fifteen states having reciprocity agreements recognizing each other’s licenses. He finds
that prices and incomes are 12 to 15 percent higher in the non-reciprocity states (p.200).
Using a more refined measure of states’ strictness in licensing, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000)
confirm Shepard’s results with respect to prices of dental services and mean dentists’
income. In addition, they find no evidence that stricter licensing influences the quality
of dental services. Shepard (1978), and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) compare more to less
restrictive states, which does not mean that dentists in less restrictive states earn a zero
rent.1,2
Our paper also contributes to the recently emerging literature that examines payoffs
to specific fields of study (e.g. Hastings et al., 2013; Grosz, 2016; Ketel et al., 2016 and
Kirkebøen et al., 2016; see also: Altonji et al., 2012, 2015). Most related is our previous
paper (Ketel et al., 2016) where we use admission lotteries to estimate the financial pay-
offs to completing medical school in the Netherlands. There we find that in every year
after graduation doctors earn at least 20 percent more than similar applicants who end up
in their next-best profession.3
Almost immediately after graduation the annual gross income of people who studied
dentistry is on average 50,000 Euros higher than what they would earn with their next-
best field of study, which amounts to a premium of 63%. We have information up to 22
years after students’ first application to study dentistry and find that the annual gain is
fairly stable over this period and is driven by income generated from self employment.
We do not find that dentists work longer hours, nor do they incur larger investments in
human capital or do they make larger sacrifices in private-life outcomes. Our preferred,
albeit residual, explanation is therefore that Dutch dentists extract a monopoly rent. The
fact that low-GPA dentists gain as least as much as high-GPA dentists is consistent with
that.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides further
details about the institutional context and the admission lottery to the dentistry study.
Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the empirical model
and the identification. Section 5 presents the main results, while Section 6 assesses the
heterogeneity of treatment effects between men and women and by high school GPA.
1The estimates reported by Shepard (1978) and Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) can best be interpreted as
associations rather than as causal effects. Neither paper points to an exogenous source of variation in states’
strictness in licensing, nor do they use a difference-in-differences approach.
2Grytten and Sørensen (2000) analyze the dental market in Norway – a country where the supply of
dentists is almost twice as large as in the Netherlands – and find no support for Norwegian dentists earning
monopoly rents.
3We compare the findings from the previous study and the current one in detail in Section 6.
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In that section, we also compare the payoffs of completing dentistry to the payoffs of
completing medical school. Section 7 discusses possible reasons for the large earnings
premium. We consider working hours, different human capital investments, sacrificing
private life and monopoly rents. Section 8 concludes and discusses possibilities to curtail
the monopoly rent Dutch dentists are likely to earn.
2 Background and institutional context
2.1 Studying dentistry in the Netherlands
High school graduates in the Netherlands who completed the academic track are eligible
for university studies in all fields of study and institutions.4 Students choose their field
of study as soon as they enter university, unlike, for example, in the US where students
specialize later. For the large majority of fields, universities have to accept all applicants
but some fields have quotas that limit the number of students that are admitted. Dentistry
is one of the studies with a quota.5
Following the rapid expansion of university enrollment in the 1970s, the Dutch Minis-
ter of Education has since 1972 the possibility to limit the number of students admitted to
specific university studies through quotas. A quota can be based on capacity constraints
of the universities and on labor market considerations. An important input for the deter-
mination of the quota for dentistry are forecasts of the future demand for dentists made
by the Royal Dutch Dentistry Association together with the Ministry of Health. This As-
sociation may protect the labor market position of the current dentists, which can result
in conservative forecasts of the future demand for dentists. For the cohorts of applicants
that we consider in this paper (1991-1999), the annual quota increased from 142 in 1991
to 216 in 1999, and was on average 180 students.
Until the year 2000, students who applied to a study with a quota were admitted on
the basis of the results from a (nationwide) centralized lottery.6 Rejected applicants are
allowed to reapply in the next year, and until 1999 they could do this as often as they
wanted.7 We observe that 65 percent of the rejected first-time applicants reapply at least
4Dutch schoolchildren are tracked into different levels at the age of 11 or 12 when they enter secondary
school. The academic track is the highest track. Around 20 percent of all students complete this track.
5Other university studies that have quotas are medical school, veterinary medicine and (in some years)
international business studies. In Ketel et al. (2016) we exploit the quota for medical school.
6Since 2000, dentistry schools are allowed to admit at most 50 percent of the students using their own
criteria. The schools have made increasing use of this. Selection is often based on motivation and previous
experience. For this reason we restrict our analysis to students who first applied to dentistry before this
change.
7In our data, the maximum number of applications of one individual is five. Since 1999, the maximum
number of applications is limited to three.
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Table 1. Lottery categories
Category High School GPA Share Weight
A GPA  8.5 0.003 2.00
B 8.0 GPA< 8.5 0.019 1.50
C 7.5 GPA< 8.0 0.035 1.25
D 7.0 GPA< 7.5 0.138 1.00
E 6.5 GPA< 7.0 0.217 0.80
F GPA< 6.5 0.400 0.67
Other - 0.187 1.00
Note: GPA is grade point average on the final exams in high school. Share is the share of applicants in the
different categories that applied for the lotteries in the years 1991-1999. Weight indicates the relative prob-
ability of being admitted. The category “Other” refers to students who did not participate in the nationwide
high-school exams, such as foreign students. This category will be excluded from the analysis.
once.8
The nationwide admission lottery is weighted such that students with a higher GPA
on their high-school exam have a higher probability to be admitted.9 High-school exams
are nationwide and externally graded on a scale from one to ten, where six and above
indicates a pass. Table 1 shows which GPA intervals are assigned to the different lottery
categories – labeled A to F – together with the shares of applicants in each category. The
category “Other” refers to students who did not attend high school in the Netherlands and
therefore did not participate in the high-school exams, such as foreign students. The final
column indicates the weights of the different categories in the lottery. The total number of
available places are divided over categories A to F such that for the number of available
places divided by the number of applicants in a category, the weights as in Table 1 hold.10
Figure 2 shows the admission rates per year by lottery category.11 In the early years
all applicants are admitted. From 1991 onwards the number of applicants exceeds the
quota, although in 1991 and 1992 the number of lottery losers is small. The majority of
applicants are in categories C to F, for which admission rates decline to only 31 percent
in 1998. Since applicants can participate in multiple lotteries, almost 73 percent of all
8Alternatively, lottery losers can decide to study dentistry abroad. Below we present evidence indicating
that the share of lottery losers enrolling in a school abroad is at most very small.
9Graduating from high school requires an exam in seven subjects including Dutch and English. Appli-
cants for dentistry should also have passed biology, chemistry, physics and math. Once the exam is passed
it cannot be retaken. Applicants can thus not retake the exam in order to end up in a higher lottery category.
10This implies that the probability of being admitted in category k equals pk = wkP/Â j w jNj where wk
is the weight given to category k 2 {A, . . . ,F,Other}, Nk the number of applicants of category k, and P
the total number of places. In case the number of available places in a category exceeds the number of
applicants, all applicants in that category are admitted. For the remaining categories the weights between
the ratios of available places and the number of applicants per category remains the same.
11Table A1 in the appendix contains more detailed information on the admission probabilities together
with the number of applicants per category per year.
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Figure 2. Probability of being admitted by year of application
persons that applied between 1991 and 1999 are eventually admitted.12
The admission lottery is centrally administered and executed. Participants in the ad-
mission lotteries can list their preferred schools. Applicants’ ranking of schools does not
affect the outcome of the lottery. Once the result from the lottery is known, the admitted
students are assigned to the schools while taking their preferences into account where
possible. For the lottery years 1991-1999, 84 percent of the lottery winners got a place
at their first-ranked university. In the Netherlands, dentistry is offered by four universi-
ties: two in Amsterdam, one in Groningen and one in Nijmegen. The study programs for
dentistry at these universities are similar in content and quality. One reason why quality
differences are small is that all Dutch universities are publicly funded and that tuition fees
are low and the same for all universities (and fields of study). Consistent with the simi-
larity of the dentistry program at different universities, there are only small differences in
the GPA of the students that list different schools as their most preferred school.
The dentistry study in the Netherlands has a nominal duration of six years and after
finishing, graduates can start practicing as a dentist. A small share (8.8% in our data) of
the graduates from the dentistry study specialize as oral surgeon or orthodontist.
12In 1999 a reform was implemented which implied that applicants with a GPA above eight (category A
and B) are automatically admitted. The weights for the other categories remained the same.
6
2.2 The market for dental services in the Netherlands
There are around 8,000 practicing dentists in the Netherlands.13 All of them are university-
educated dentists who are registered by the government.
Dental practices in the Netherlands are private, there are no state practices. The typical
practice is small, with one dentist and one assistant. In the larger cities some practices are
larger, consisting of several dentists, assistants and dental hygienists. Oral surgeons are
mostly affiliated with a hospital and orthodontists mostly run a private practice. Patients
are referred to these specialists by their regular dentists. A growing number of Dutch
dentists employ the services of a dental hygienist, and in the larger cities particularly,
there are also separate dental hygienist practices.
Many Dutch inhabitants attend their dentists once or twice a year for regular check-
ups. Patients are responsible for the payment of their treatment costs. For children under
age 18, dentistry costs are covered by the basic health insurance which is compulsory
for all citizens. Adults can insure for dental care by supplementary insurance packages.
These packages can cover up to 75 percent of costs, but they are subject to caps which
limit the amount that is covered by the insurance. Only 45 percent of people in the Nether-
lands buy supplementary dental insurance. Godfried et al. (2001) report evidence of ad-
verse selection into supplementary dental insurance in the Netherlands.
On behalf of the government, the Dutch Health Care Authority sets maximum rates for
all dental treatments, where treatments are described in uniform codes. All Dutch dentists
must adhere to these codes. The maximum rates result from negotiations between the
Health Care Authority and the Dutch Association for Dentistry.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources and sample
Our data come from several sources. The first source is the administrative registry of
the agency (DUO) that conducts the admission lotteries and also registers enrollment and
study progress of all Dutch students in higher education. These data contain all applicants
for the dentistry study, their lottery category (but not their exact GPA) and the outcomes of
the lotteries. Furthermore, from the enrollment registry we obtain the actual study choices
of both winning and losing lottery applicants. Information on study progress is available
as the agency registers when and whether students successfully complete certain stages
of their studies.
We exclude all applicants who applied for the first time after 1999 because from the
13Information in this subsection is partly based on Rietrae (2016).
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year 2000 onwards dentistry schools can admit up to 50 percent of their students using
their own criteria. We also exclude applicants from lottery category A because all of them
have been admitted to dentistry. This leaves us with a sample of 2,373 persons.
Using social security numbers, the lottery and enrollment information from DUO is
merged to individual administrative records of all Dutch citizens kept by Statistics Nether-
lands (we lose 9 observations without a valid social security number, reducing the final
sample to 2,364 observations). The data of Statistics Netherlands include information
from municipalities, tax authorities and social insurance administrations. This includes
detailed information on earnings from various sources, labor supply and individual char-
acteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity and marital status. All inhabitants of the Nether-
lands are registered at a municipality, which means that if a person is not in our data in a
particular year, this person did not live in the Netherlands in that year. Data from Statistics
Netherlands cover the years 1999 to 2015. Statistics Netherlands also has records from
the so–called BIG-register which includes all health-care professionals in the Nether-
lands, which can be linked. This register provides information regarding individual qual-
ifications and entitlement to practice. From this register we know whether someone is
licensed as a dentist.
For self-employed workers, the administrative records from Statistics Netherlands
contain no information on working hours. Since the majority of the dentists are self-
employed, we cannot compare working hours and hourly wages between winners and
losers of the first lottery. To examine whether the large income payoff to the dentistry
study we find below, is due to long working hours, we use information from the research
project “Study & Work” which is based on an annual survey among people who recently
finished their studies and entered the labor market. The data have been collected by col-
lected by SEO Amsterdam Economics for each year from 1997 to 2015. The survey asks
which field of study someone completed and also whether someone ever participated in
an admission lottery and if so, for which field of study. A disadvantage of the survey is
that the answers cannot be linked to the other administrative data, but the survey has the
advantage that it contains information about working hours, both for employees and for
self employed workers.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents the balancing of the available pre-treatment characteristics between win-
ners and losers of their first lottery.14 We show the sample means of the individual char-
acteristics and report the p-value for equality obtained from regressing this characteristic
14When there can be no confusion we sometimes refer to winners and losers of their first lottery as
“lottery winners” and “lottery losers”.
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Table 2. Balancing of personal characteristics by admission status of the first lottery
application
Lottery Lottery p-value
winners losers
Female 0.49 0.49 0.50
Age at first application 18.8 18.8 0.68
Non-western immigrant 0.09 0.11 0.51
Number of individuals 1,244 1,120
Note: The p-values in the final column are weighted by the admittance probabilities for students in different
years of application.
on a dummy for winning the lottery and the full interaction of year of lottery fixed effects
and lottery category fixed effects. Each p-value comes from a separate regression. About
49 percent of the applicants are female, the average age at the first application is 18.8,
and around 10 percent of the sample are from non-western origin. The p-values raise no
concern about the randomness of the admission lotteries.
Table 3 presents summary statistics on study achievement and labor-market outcomes
by result of the first lottery. Lottery losers have, on average, a lower GPA on the sec-
ondary school exams, which follows mechanically from the GPA-weighted lottery. The
result of the first lottery is associated with a more than 50 percentage points increase in
enrollment into dentistry. Not everyone who wins the first lottery actually enrolls in den-
tistry; ten percent do not. Among the losers of the first lottery, almost 40 percent end up
enrolling for dentistry (after winning a subsequent lottery). Of the winners 78 percent
complete the dentistry study, compared to 36 percent for the losers. Finally, almost all
individuals who complete dentistry also register as a dentist, and are therefore licensed.
The small difference between completion and registration rates may be caused by the fact
that registration by definition can only be done after graduation. Additionally, for lottery
losers it might be that some individuals obtained a dental degree abroad and afterwards
registered as a dentist in the Netherlands. In the analyses these individuals are treated as
non-completers of the dentistry study. This is likely to bias the estimates of the payoffs to
dentistry slightly downwards.
Enrollment, completion and being licensed all give very similar first stages (with cor-
respondingly similar IV estimates of the effects of “enrollment in dentistry”, “completion
of dentistry” and “being licensed as a dentist”). We focus the discussion of the results in
terms of completion of dentistry.15
For the interpretation of the estimated payoffs to completion of dentistry it is impor-
15See Altonji et al. (2015) for a discussion about the exclusion restriction in case a substantial share of
those who enroll would not complete.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics by admission status of the first lottery application
Lottery Lottery
winners losers
Study enrollment and completion
Average GPA high school exam 6.76 6.59
Enrolled in dentistry 0.90 0.39
Completed dentistry 0.78 0.36
Licensed as dentist 0.77 0.38
Enrolled in study program in the Netherlands 0.99 0.97
Completed study program in the Netherlands 0.98 0.98
Labor market outcomes
Annual real (2014) taxable earnings (1999-2015) 71,978 45,185
Self-employed 0.60 0.38
Family outcomes
Married 0.59 0.54
Partner 0.83 0.81
Children (Yes/No) 0.76 0.69
Number of children 1.68 1.40
Number of individuals 1,244 1,120
Note: The lottery is weighted so that the observed differences between lottery losers and lottery winners
cannot be given a causal interpretation. For the outcomes self-employed, married and children we take the
outcome in the last year that we observe the individual in the registry (for 94 percent of the individuals this
is the year 2015). At this point in time the individuals are on average 39 years old.
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tant to know which alternatives the lottery losers choose. Most lottery losers attend a
study program in the Netherlands.16 Only three percent of the lottery losers never register
for higher education in the Netherlands. These individuals may not have enrolled in any
study program or may have studied abroad. Of the lottery participants that do not enroll
in dentistry but do enroll in Dutch higher education 33 percent enroll in a health-related
field (eight percent in medical school). Other fields that are frequently chosen are Eco-
nomics and Law (28 percent), Science and Engineering (19 percent) and Social Sciences,
Humanities and Education (16 percent). Almost all lottery participants complete a study
program in the Netherlands.
Table 3 also shows the means of earnings. Earnings are measured as the sum of
before-tax income from employment, income from self-employment, income from abroad
and other income from labor. Earnings are observed annually for all residents in the
Netherlands. All amounts are corrected for the average wage development of university
graduates over the observation period and expressed to constant 2014 Euros. Table 3
shows that earnings are, on average, around 60 percent higher for winners than for losers.
Of the winners, 60 percent are self-employed compared to 38 percent for lottery losers.
Finally, the bottom part of the table shows descriptive statistics for family outcomes in
the last year that an individual is observed (2015 for 94 percent of the sample). Winners
of the lottery are more likely to be married or have a partner and to have children.
4 Empirical approach
To estimate the payoff to dentistry we apply the same empirical approach as in Ketel et al.
(2016). We assume a linear relationship between the labor-market outcome of individual
i in year t who applied for the first time to study dentistry in year t (Yitt ) and having
completed dentistry (Dit ):
Yitt = at + gt t +dt tDi+Xibt t +LCit +Uitt (1)
where t t indicates the number of years elapsed between the year of the first lottery and
the year in which the outcome is observed. Xi is a vector of controls including gender,
ethnicity and age at first lottery, and LCit is the interaction between lottery category and
year of first lottery. at and gt t are fixed effects for the year in which the outcome is
observed and the number of years since the first application. Uitt is the error term. The
parameters of interest are dt t which describe the payoffs to completing dentistry t  t
years after first applying. We estimate equation (1) separately for 0 to 22 years since the
first lottery participation.
16Recall that enrollment for almost all study programs in the Netherlands is unlimited and unrestricted.
11
If highly motivated students self-select into dentistry, the OLS estimator of dt t will
be biased. The lottery seems to solve this problem, but completing dentistry remains
potentially endogenous. Not all admitted students actually enroll and complete dentistry,
and lottery losers often reapply in subsequent years. Therefore, we instrument Di with
the result (0/1) of the first lottery (LR1i) in which individual i participated. We estimate a
first-stage equation of the form:
Di = kt t +lt tLR1i+Xiqt t +LCit +Vit t (2)
The identifying assumption is that conditional on Xi and LCit the result in the first lot-
tery is mean independent of Uitt : E[Uitt |Xi,LCit ,LR1i] = E[Uitt |Xi,LCit ]. Recall from
above that individuals who are in the same year in the same lottery category, have the
same probability to be admitted. This conditional random assignment guarantees that the
conditional mean independence assumption holds.
In equation (2) the parameter lt t reflects the difference in completion rates between
winners and losers of the first lottery.17 An interpretation of lt t is that it describes
the fraction of compliers in the data, which are applicants for whom completion of the
dentistry study is determined by the result of the first lottery.18 By estimating equation
(1) separately for each number of years after the first lottery, we estimate how the earnings
payoff develops during the first 22 years after the first lottery. This period captures the
potentially longer study duration of dentistry compared to alternative studies, and thereby
provides an estimate of the opportunity costs of the longer investment in human capital.
5 The payoff to completion of dentistry
Table 4 reports estimates of the effect of completing dentistry on (log) annual earnings.
Performing our regressions separately by number of years after the first lottery (t   t)
implies that each regression uses different subsamples. The second column reports the
number of observations in each regression and shows how this varies across rows. The
first row (t  t = 0) is based on 1999-earnings information of people who first applied in
1999. The second row is based on 2000-earnings information of people who first applied
in 1999 and on 1999-earnings information of people who first applied in 1998, and so
on.19
17Because we perform separate regressions for the number of years since the first lottery, we estimate a
separate l for each value of t  t .
18Hence, compliers are applicants who complete dentistry after winning the first lottery and do not com-
plete dentistry after losing the first lottery. Note that the latter may also be the result of losing the first
lottery, participate in a second (or higher) lottery and also lose that lottery.
19In principle it is possible to extend the analysis to 23 and 24 years after the first lottery since we observe
lottery losers from 1991 onwards. For these years the sample sizes get, however, too small.
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The first-stage regressions describe the effect of winning the first lottery on the proba-
bility to complete dentistry. The first-stage estimates in column (3) are highly significant,
with the F-statistics ranging from 28 to 391, and are all close to 0.40; winning the first
lottery increases the probability to complete dentistry with around 40 percentage points.
The fourth column of Table 4 presents the instrumental variable estimates of the effect
of completing dentistry on the level of annual earnings (in thousands of Euros). These es-
timates are also plotted in Figure 3. During the first five years after the first lottery, the
payoff to completing the dentistry study is significantly negative. During their studies,
those who will complete dentistry earn 2000 to 3000 Euros less per year than they would
have earned in their next-best alternative. This is due to some of the lottery losers work-
ing full time instead of immediately enrolling in an alternative study, and to some lottery
losers who enrolled in an alternative study having higher earnings from side jobs. The
negative payoff during the first five year captures the foregone earnings of studying den-
tistry instead of the next-best alternative. Six years after the first lottery a substantial share
of those studying dentistry complete their studies and enter the labor market. One year
later almost all of those studying dentistry completed their studies. From then on, the
gross annual earning of dentists are on average around 50,000 Euros higher than the gross
annual earnings in the next-best alternative. This amount stays fairly constant during the
subsequent 15 years.20
The fifth column of Table 4 shows results for the effect of completion of dentistry on
the logarithm of earnings, conditional on having positive earnings. The observed pattern
is very similar to the pattern for the level of earnings (which includes zeros). During
the first six years after the lottery, dentistry students have lower log earnings than they
would have had in their next-best alternative. This reverses in the sixth year. Because
the amount of the earnings gap stays relatively stable while the level of earnings in the
next-best alternative increases over time, the log earnings payoff decreases over time from
1.43 after seven years to 0.49 after 22 years. A log earnings differential of 0.49 implies
that earnings as a dentist are 63 percent above earnings in the next-best alternative.
The final column shows the effect of medical school on the probability of having no
earnings, the extensive margin employment effect. This confirms that future dentists are
more likely to have zero earnings while studying than would be the case in their next-best
alternative. From six years after the first lottery onwards all point estimates in the final
column are negative, and some significantly, indicating that dentists are more likely to
20There is are strong fluctuations in earnings payoffs 20 years after the first lottery. In that period also
confidence intervals widen substantially. The reason is that these payoffs are estimated on only few ob-
servations, i.e. only the cohorts of individuals who first participated in the lottery in the first few years
of our observation period. In that period only few individuals lost the lottery and never became dentist.
Therefore, a straight line through the estimates between 19 and 22 years after the first lottery falls in the
90% confidence interval.
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Figure 3. Instrumental variable estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on
earnings t  t years after first applying (colored area is 90 percent confidence interval)
have positive earnings than would be the case in their alternative profession.
In Figure 4 we show the predicted earnings profiles for an average individual with and
without completion of dentistry. We estimate expected earnings using
Yitt ⇥Di = at + gt t +d1,t tDi+Xibt t +LCit +Uitt (3)
Yitt ⇥ (1 Di) = at + gt t +d0,t t(1 Di)+Xibt t +LCit +Uitt (4)
where both Di on the right-hand side of equation (3) and 1 Di on the right-hande side
of equation (4) are instrumented using the result of the first lottery (LRi). The coeffi-
cient d1,t t (d0,t t ) gives the expected earnings of an average individual with (without)
completion of dentistry, Yˆ1,t t (Yˆ0,t t ). The graph shows that annual earnings with and
without completion of dentistry increase with the number of years after the first lottery.
The difference between the two profiles is fairly constant over time.
6 Heterogeneous treatment effects
We now turn to heterogeneity in the payoffs to dentistry. We first examine differences
between men and women. Next, we investigate differences by ability as measured by
students’ GPA categories. Finally, we compare the earnings payoffs of dentists with the
earnings payoffs to completion of medical school in the Netherlands, which we studied in
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Figure 4. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels
Ketel et al. (2016).
Gender
Figure 5 shows the estimated earnings payoffs separately for men and women.21 During
the study period the payoff profiles for men and women coincide. In the sixth year after
the first lottery the payoff is larger for women than for men, reflecting that women usually
complete their study faster than men. Between eight and 18 years after the first lottery
the payoffs are higher for men than for women, and this difference is quite substantial
between 12 and 17 years. Over the entire period the undiscounted sum of the payoffs for
men is 164,000 Euros higher than the undiscounted sum of the payoffs for women; at a
discount rate of 5% the difference in favor of male dentists amounts to 81,000 Euros.
Figure 6 repeats Figure 4 by showing predicted earnings profiles, but now for men and
women, separately. This shows that for women – dentists and non-dentists – the earnings
profiles are relatively flat from 10 years after the first lottery onwards. For men— dentists
and non-dentists alike – earnings profiles are increasing during a much longer period. The
increase is steeper for male dentists than for male non-dentists.
Ten percent of the male dentists specialize as orthodontist or oral surgeon, for female
dentists this share is 7 percent. This difference is too small to explain why payoffs for
men are higher than for women.
21Table A2 in the appendix reports the estimates.
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Figure 5. IV estimates of effects of dentistry completion on earnings, by year since first
lottery and gender (colored areas are 90 percent confidence intervals).
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Figure 6. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels by gender
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Figure 7. IV estimates of effects of dentistry completion on earnings, by year since first
lottery and lottery category
Ability
The lottery assigns applicants with a higher GPA on their high-school exams a higher
probability to be admitted. This justifies the question whether there is a difference in
earnings gain between people with different GPA’s. To examine this, we estimated earn-
ings payoffs by year after first lottery separately for lottery categories C to F.22 Figure 7
reports the results. For categories C and D the estimates in the first years and last years
are not very precise due to small sample sizes.
During most years after finishing the dentistry study, the annual payoff is higher for
applicants from categories E and F than for applicants from categories C and D, that is:
Low-GPA dentists have higher payoffs than high-GPA dentists. Weighted by their sample
shares, the sum of undiscounted payoffs for applicants from categories C and D is 69,000
Euros lower than the undiscounted payoffs for applicants from categories E and F. At a
discount rate of 5% the difference in favor of dentists from lower GPA categories amounts
to 39,000 Euros. Figure B1 in the Appendix indicates that the difference in favor of low-
GPA applicants results from a combination of low-GPA applicants having higher earnings
as dentist than high-GPA applicants (upper graph), and high-GPA applicants (especially
from category D) having higher counterfactual earnings than low-GPA applicants (bottom
22Category A is omitted since there are so few lottery losers in this category. Category B has so few
applicants that power is lacking to run the analysis separately for this category. All estimated coefficients
are in Table A3 in the appendix.
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Table 5. Characteristics of applicants and graduates of medical school versus dentistry
Applicants Graduates
Dentistry Medical p- Dentistry Medical p-
school value school value
Female (%) 49.0 58.4 0.00 50.8 60.4 0.00
GPA high school exam 6.7 6.9 0.00 6.7 7.0 0.00
Age at first application 18.8 18.3 0.00 18.7 18.2 0.00
Non-western immigrant (%) 9.5 7.5 0.00 8.2 6.9 0.10
Number of individuals 2,359 25,393 1,372 15,372
Notes: p-values based on t-test for unequal variances.
graph). These results give no ground for an admission policy that favors applicants with
higher GPA.
Comparison with medical school applicants
In Ketel et al. (2016) we used admission lotteries to estimate the earnings payoff to com-
pletion of medical school in the Netherlands. In this subsection we compare the results for
applicants for dentistry with the results for medical school applicants. Table 5 compares
characteristics of the two samples of applicants. Among applicants for dentistry the share
of women is almost 10 percentage points lower than among applicants for the female-
majority medical study. The mean of GPA is also lower for prospective dentists than for
prospective doctors and applicants for dentistry are on average five months older than ap-
plicants for medical school. Finally, the share of non-western immigrants is somewhat
higher among dentistry applicants than among medical school applicants.
Applicants for dentistry and for medical school also differ somewhat in the next-best
field that rejected compliers choose. Twenty-eight percent of the rejected compliers for
dentistry study economics or law, while this share is only 15 percent for the rejected
compliers for medical school. Nineteen percent of the rejected compliers for dentistry
study science or engineering. This share is 25 percent for the rejected compliers for
medical school. Rejected compliers from the two pools of applicants are equally likely to
opt for another health-related field and to study social and behavioral sciences.
Figure 8 shows in a single graph the payoffs to medical school (in red) and to the den-
tistry study (in blue). The payoffs profile for doctors is very different from that of dentists.
The first phase of the medical study takes one year more than the (entire) dentistry study.
After six year of medical school, doctors specialize for another six to nine years. Dur-
ing the specialization phase doctors earn a salary, which is higher than what they would
have earned in their next-best profession. Because the salary during the specialization is
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Figure 8. IV estimates of effects of dentistry versus medical school completion on
earnings, by year since first lottery
constant, the payoff for doctors declines between years 8 to 12. After 12 years medical
school students start to finish their specialization and their payoffs are increasing. Nine-
teen years after the first lottery doctors catch up with dentists, and both groups earn an
annual payoff of around 50,000 Euros. This explanation is confirmed by Figure B2 in the
Appendix, that splits total earnings into profits (for self-employed dentists/doctors) and
wage earnings. Dentists can enter self-employment directly after graduating, and thus di-
rectly capture rents. Doctors first need to specialize, and their total payoffs only catch up
with those of dentists once a larger share of their income comes from self-employment.
Figure B3 in the Appendix shows that the higher payoffs for dentists than for doctors
are not due to dentists having worse counterfactual earnings. On the contrary, the counter-
factual earnings for dentists are higher than the counterfactual earnings for doctors. This
suggests that the two studies attract different types of applicants.
7 Mechanisms
In this section we discuss possible mechanisms for the high payoffs to the dentistry study.
The mechanisms that we consider are working hours, human capital investments, sacri-
fices in family life, and monopoly rents.
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Hours
One reason why dentists earn such high incomes may be that they work long hours. The
data from Statistics Netherlands do not contain information on working hours for peo-
ple who are self employed. Because a majority of dentists is self employed we can not
address this issue using the merged register and admission lottery data. Fortunately, the
research project “Study & Work” conducted by SEO Amsterdam Economics, gives rele-
vant information.
This project is based on an annual survey among people who recently finished their
studies and entered the labor market. Data have been collected for each year from 1997
to 2015. The survey asks which field of study someone completed. This identifies the
respondents who completed the dentistry study. The survey also asks whether someone
ever participated in an admission lottery and if so, for which field of study. This identifies
the respondents who lost the lottery for dentistry. With regard to working hours, the
survey asks about contract hours (both for employees and for self employed) and about
practice (actual) hours. Table 9 reports the mean numbers of hours for dentists and for
losers of the lottery for dentistry together with their standard deviations and the numbers
of observations.23 This is based on pooled data from all waves. Results are presented for
men and women together and separately for men and women.
The results in the table show that dentists work significantly fewer hour than respon-
dents who lost the lottery for dentistry (and didn’t become a dentist). In contract hours
the difference is 5.2 hours per week, and for practice hours 5.5 hours per week. These dif-
ferences are very similar for men and for women. The table also shows that male dentists
work around 4 (around 14%) more hours per week than female dentists. This partly ex-
plains why male dentists earn more than female dentists, and may also partly explain why
male dentists have a higher payoff (measured in Euros) to dentistry than female dentists.24
We conclude that differences in working hours cannot explain the earnings payoff to
completing the dentistry study. If anything, dentists work fewer hours than comparable
others. This is consistent with leisure being a normal good.
23We gratefully acknowledge the help of Paul Bisschop from SEO Amsterdam Economics for supplying
this information.
24The Wage Indicator Survey which is annually collected by the Amsterdam Institute for Labor Studies
(AIAS) also contains information about level of education, occupation and actual working hours per week.
The number of dentists in the pooled sample that report their working hours is in this dataset only 54. In
this data it is not possible to identify who lost the lottery for dentistry. When we compare dentists with all
others in this dataset who attained a university degree, we find that dentists work on average 1.5 hours less
per week than the comparison group (p= 0.068).
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Figure 9. Working hours per week
Human capital investments
After completion of the dentistry study, winning compliers possess a different set of
knowledge and skills than compliers who lost the lottery. It is not possible to assess
what share of the payoff to dentistry should be attributed to the specific knowledge and
skills bundle without detailed information on people’s human capital. We do, however,
have information about the opportunity costs of the human capital acquisition of dentists.
Because we have estimated effects of studying dentistry on annual earnings starting in
the year of the first lottery, the estimates cover the period that applicants are enrolled in
(dentistry) school.
Inspection of Table 4 and Figure 3 reveals that winning compliers have lower annual
incomes than losing compliers until five years after the first lottery, but the differences
are modest and completely wiped out by the substantially higher incomes of winning
compliers in later years.
Family outcomes
To assess whether the high incomes of dentists are a compensating differential for large
sacrifices in their personal life, we estimated the impact of completing dentistry on the
probabilities of being married or having a partner and on having children. Being less likely
to be married or having a partner and having no or fewer children may signal restrictions
in the possibility to build a family life.25 Table 6 reports the results.
The effect of studying dentistry on family outcomes are more favorable for men than
for women. For women there is no significant effect on being married or having a part-
25This assumes that being married or having a partner and having children represent voluntary choices,
while being single or not having children may not.
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Table 6. Family outcomes
All Men Women
Married/Partner 0.04 (0.04) 0.12 (0.06)** -0.02 (0.06)
Has Children 0.09 (0.05)* 0.14 (0.07)** 0.03 (0.07)
Number of children 0.28 (0.13)** 0.31 (0.18)* 0.22 (0.18)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Total number of individuals is 2359 (1204 men and 1155
women). * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01 . Every cell in this column represents a separate
regression, which include controls for gender (in the first column), ethnicity, age in the first lottery year,
lottery category, year of first lottery and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category
ner, while for men there is a significant 12 percentage points (s.e. 6 percentage points)
increase. Completion of dentistry raises the probability to have children for men by 14
percentage points. For women the effect is small and insignificant. Completion of den-
tistry has a positive effect on the number of children for men, but not for women. We
conclude that differences in family outcomes cannot explain the earnings payoff to com-
pletion of the dentistry study.
Monopoly rents
The previous three subsections establish that the high payoffs to completing the dentistry
study cannot be attributed to long working hours, large human capital investments and
sacrifices in the personal lives of dentists. The obvious remaining explanation is that
Dutch dentists are extracting a monopoly rent. The supply of dentists in the Netherlands
is low due to the quota that the Dutch government sets on the inflow into dentistry schools.
Regulations and language barriers restrain the supply of foreign doctors. Whether the
supply restrictions results in a monopoly rent depends on the elasticity of the demand for
dentists and on what the equilibrium number of dentists would have been. The demand for
health care services is considered to be rather inelastic, with price elasticities around -0.2
(e.g. Liu and Chollet, 2006), while the estimates in the final column of Table 3 indicate
that an oversupply of dentists is unlikely. Two necessary conditions for supply restrictions
to lead to monopoly rents are therefore satisfied.
While we have no direct proof of rent extraction, the low density of dentists in the
Netherlands compared to other countries and the fact that the payoffs are large for all
GPA categories (see Figure 7) are consistent with it.
8 Conclusion
This paper documents a large earnings payoff to completion of the dentistry study in the
Netherlands. Applicants who won the first admission lottery and studied dentistry earn
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from the first year that they enter the labor market onwards, 50,000 Euros per year more
than what they would earn had they lost the first admission lottery and ended up in their
second-best profession. This large earnings differential cannot be explained by dentists
working longer hours. On the contrary, dentists work around 14% fewer hours per week
than people who participated in the lottery for dentistry school and lost. We also do not
find any support that the large earnings gain reflect a compensating differential for larger
human capital investments or sacrifices in private life outcomes. Our preferred, albeit
residual, explanation is that Dutch dentists are extracting a monopoly rent. The fact that
low-GPA dentists gain as least as much as high-GPA dentists is consistent with that.
The rent extracted by dentists can be curtailed through four different measures: i) in-
crease the tuition fee for dentistry schools; ii) admit more applicants to dentistry schools;
iii) attract more dentists from abroad; and iv) lower the maximum rates that dentists are
allowed to charge.
Increasing the tuition fee reduces the rent by increasing the costs of studying dentistry.
As long as the new tuition fee does not result in fewer applicants than the number of
available seats, this measure will not affect the number of dentists. A shortcoming of this
measure is that it will only affect new cohorts of dentists. Those who already finished
their studies are unaffected and prices which consumers have to pay for dental services
remain high.
Admitting more applicants to dentistry schools will increase the future supply of den-
tists. This may in turn trigger price competition among dentists and thereby reduce the
prices they charge. This measure has several disadvantages. First, in a system where edu-
cation is mainly publicly funded, admitting more applicants is costly for the government
(unless tuition fees are increased substantially). Second, supply will only slowly increase,
implying that prices remain high in the near future and many of the current dentists are
only modestly affected. Third, an increase in the supply of dentists may lead to supplier-
induced demand. Fourth, instead of competing on prices, dentists may collude and choose
to work less.
An alternative method to increase the supply of dentists is to attract more dentists from
abroad. Currently only dentists from other countries from the European Union can prac-
tice dentistry in the Netherlands without further requirements, although the association of
dentists discourages this by emphasizing language barriers. More foreign dentists from
outside the EU can be attracted by being less restrictive on licensing. This measure po-
tentially reduces the average quality of dentists. Moreover, immigration of dentists shifts
the bill of dentistry schools to other (often poorer) countries.
Reducing the maximum rates and thereby the actual rates, is probably the more ef-
fective measure. It reduces the rent for all dentists (old and new cohorts) immediately.
24
Lower rents may reduce the number of applicants but will not affect the supply of dentists
as long as the reduction of the number of applicants does not exceed 50 percent. Reduc-
ing the maximum rates may increase the demand for dental services. Given that currently
dentists are working around 30 hours per week, it seems feasible to meet the increased
demand by increasing the number of working hours per dentist.
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Table A2. IV estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on earnings, by year since
first lottery and gender
Earnings (xC1000)
t  t Men Women
0 -2.7 (1.4)** -1.2 (1.2)
1 -3.8 (1.2)*** -3.3 (1.2)***
2 -2.2 (0.9)** -1.4 (0.7)**
3 -2.6 (0.9)*** -1.7 (0.8)**
4 -1.5 (1.2) -2.7 (0.9)***
5 -1.6 (1.6) -4.2 (1.4)***
6 21.0 (4.0)*** 30.0 (4.5)***
7 49.9 (6.7)*** 49.1 (5.4)***
8 58.3 (7.2)*** 43.6 (5.2)***
9 57.2 (8.2)*** 41.5 (5.7)***
10 53.1 (8.6)*** 42.6 (5.8)***
11 55.9 (9.7)*** 48.8 (6.6)***
12 59.0 (10.0)*** 46.2 (6.4)***
13 59.4 (10.0)*** 38.3 (6.4)***
14 64.3 (10.3)*** 44.7 (7.4)***
15 68.8 (11.5)*** 46.3 (8.2)***
16 67.8 (10.5)*** 31.0 (7.9)***
17 62.2 (11.5)*** 46.8 (8.0)***
18 54.9 (13.9)*** 46.4 (9.3)***
19 38.6 (14.4)*** 56.8 (12.6)***
20 23.0 (19.2) 36.4 (12.3)***
21 35.5 (22.2) 15.1 (20.9)
22 46.9 (44.2) 47.7 (20.2)**
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10 . ** p < 0.05 . *** p < 0.01 . Every cell in
this table represents a separate regression, which include controls for ethnicity, age in the first lottery year,
lottery category, year of first lottery and interaction terms of the year of first lottery and lottery category.
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Table A3. IV estimates of the effects of completing dentistry on earnings (xC1000) by
year since first lottery and lottery category
t  t C D E F
0 -0.3 (2.3) -3.0 (1.5)** -0.8 (1.9) -2.6 (1.5)*
1 -20.6 (23.8) -3.9 (1.2)*** -0.9 (2.0) -4.5 (1.3)***
2 -2.5 (3.3) -2.3 (1.3)* -0.6 (1.0) -2.6 (1.0)**
3 -2.1 (2.2) -2.6 (1.5)* -1.7 (1.1) -2.1 (1.0)**
4 0.5 (1.9) -3.4 (1.8)* -2.4 (1.2)** -1.9 (1.2)
5 3.9 (4.0) -4.2 (2.3)* -2.2 (2.2) -3.4 (1.6)**
6 74.7 (21.2)*** 26.0 (7.3)*** 32.9 (5.9)*** 16.2 (4.0)***
7 60.5 (22.4)*** 49.9 (8.4)*** 57.6 (8.9)*** 43.1 (6.1)***
8 47.5 (21.7)** 52.7 (8.7)*** 47.6 (9.4)*** 52.6 (6.5)***
9 53.4 (22.1)** 38.5 (10.4)*** 41.5 (9.1)*** 54.6 (7.9)***
10 62.2 (27.4)** 34.3 (12.2)*** 39.0 (9.5)*** 56.6 (7.8)***
11 38.2 (38.6) 35.7 (11.9)*** 50.2 (11.0)*** 60.8 (8.8)***
12 56.1 (22.2)** 40.1 (16.3)** 50.1 (11.1)*** 56.4 (8.5)***
13 37.6 (23.1) 33.3 (16.1)** 50.1 (10.8)*** 51.4 (9.0)***
14 43.7 (20.5)** 39.0 (17.6)** 51.3 (11.7)*** 59.9 (9.2)***
15 43.4 (20.2)** 44.9 (20.4)** 63.6 (13.1)*** 59.3 (9.9)***
16 49.8 (24.6)** 58.0 (18.9)*** 53.5 (12.8)*** 47.0 (9.2)***
17 44.1 (24.1)* 50.7 (18.9)*** 69.2 (13.7)*** 52.6 (10.0)***
18 44.8 (33.1) 48.1 (27.4)* 64.7 (15.9)*** 46.3 (10.9)***
19 87.9 (39.7)** 36.9 (21.7)* 77.6 (24.3)*** 40.4 (11.6)***
20 146.5 (63.6)** 35.2 (20.8)* 16.1 (23.6) 32.3 (17.2)*
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p< 0.10 . ** p< 0.05 . *** p< 0.01 . Every cell in this
table represents a separate regression, which include controls for gender, ethnicity, age in the first lottery
year and year of first lottery.
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Figure B1. Predicted counterfactual earnings levels by lottery category
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Figure B2. IV estimates of effects of dentistry versus medical school completion on
profits and wages, by year since first lottery
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Figure B3. Predicted earnings levels of dentistry versus medical school completion, by
year since first lottery
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